Lone parents and informal childcare: A tax credit childcare subsidy? by Skinner, Christine & Finch, Naomi
This is a repository copy of Lone parents and informal childcare: A tax credit childcare 
subsidy?.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/1807/
Article:
Skinner, Christine orcid.org/0000-0001-8548-9009 and Finch, Naomi 
orcid.org/0000-0001-5753-1783 (2006) Lone parents and informal childcare: A tax credit 
childcare subsidy? Social Policy and Administration. pp. 807-823. ISSN 1467-9515 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9515.2006.00534.x
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright 
exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy 
solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The 
publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White 
Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, 
users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
  
Lone Parents and Informal Childcare: 
A Tax Credit Childcare Subsidy? 
 
ARTICLE  
For Social Policy and Administration 
 
This article was published December 2006 in the journal Social Policy and 
Administration: 
Skinner, C. and Finch, N. (2006) Lone parents and informal childcare: a tax credit 
childcare subsidy? Social Policy and Administration, 40, 7, 807-23. 
  
This is an author produced version of the article published by Blackwell publishing. 
This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-
corrections or journal pagination. 
 
Link to the online version: 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/spol/2006/00000040/00000007/art00005;
jsessionid=36vt99nsf29dw.alice
 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2006.00534.x 
 
The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
 1
White Rose Consortium ePrints Repository : http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/1807/
 Abstract: 
 
The Labour government aims to increase the lone parent employment rate to 
70 percent by 2010. To achieve this aim, it has introduced a state subsidy for 
childcare in the form of the childcare element of the Working Tax Credit. But 
this has thus far been limited to formal childcare despite evidence that lone 
parents are more likely to use informal childcare. This paper investigates the 
potential of a state subsidy to be extended to support informal childcare. 
Utilizing evidence from a study of 78 qualitative in-depth interviews with lone 
parents, it explores preferences for informal care and the way that informal 
care is negotiated. On the one hand we find that some lone parents held 
deeply embedded preferences for informal childcare based on trust, 
commitment, shared understandings and children’s happiness. Thus it can be 
concluded that it is important for the government to support informal as well 
as formal care. On the other, we found that the way lone parents actually 
negotiated informal childcare involved complex notions of obligation, duty and 
reciprocity, suggesting that a subsidy could potentially intrude upon complex 
private family relationships. But, the evidence suggests that care was 
negotiated differently depending on whether it was provided by a grandparent 
or other family and friends, with lone parents tending to favour paying for 
childcare provided by other family and friends than by grandparents. This has 
implications for a state subsidy, which needs further investigation.    
 
Key words: Lone parents; informal childcare, negotiation, grandparents, 
working tax credit, childcare subsidy 
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Introduction 
 
The Labour government aims to increase the lone parent employment rate to 
70 percent by 2010 as part of welfare reform and child poverty strategies. To 
that end, a variety of labour market polices have been introduced including; 
financial incentives via working tax credits for low income households, 
practical help via the New Deal for Lone Parents and a National Childcare 
Strategy (NCS) that aims to increase the number of formal childcare places 
and to improve quality and affordability. These measures have been 
introduced with the understanding that structural factors are the main 
inhibitors of lone parents’ employment. Indeed, following these measures 
some progress has been made with 55.5 per cent of lone parents in 
employment in 2005, an increase of 10.5 percentage points since 1997 (ONS 
2006). 
 
However, numerous enquiries have concluded that despite improvements, the 
additional childcare resources, though welcome, have not gone far enough. 
There are still significant barriers for mothers in returning to work because of a 
lack of good quality, convenient and affordable formal childcare. Despite a 
rise in the use of formal childcare services since the strategy, many parents 
including lone parents still rely on, and prefer, informal care provided by family 
and friends. Yet in 2003, support for informal care with a state subsidy via the 
tax credit system was rejected by government as being too contentious and 
too difficult to administer. This remains the case in 2005; there is no plan to 
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address this in the first ever Childcare Bill (2005). Rather, the focus is on 
ensuring sufficient formal childcare places which are eligible for the state 
subsidy with the view to facilitate parental employment among low income 
and lone parent families. Our paper begins by outlining the reasons behind 
the government’s rejection of an informal childcare subsidy and the limitations 
of their current efforts to focus on formal childcare.  
 
The paper then uses new evidence from a research study on lone parent 
families (of whom the majority are mothers) to revisit the potential for a 
childcare subsidy for informal care. The study explored the complex interplay 
between attitudes/ beliefs and decisions about childcare (formal and informal) 
and employment, as well as the ways in which informal childcare was 
negotiated between family members.  It did not explicitly explore an informal 
childcare subsidy, but much of the evidence on attitudes and the day to day 
negotiation of childcare provide some useful insights which are drawn upon 
here to advance the debate to see if there is scope for a state subsidy through 
Working Tax Credit. Specifically, the research suggests that informal childcare 
is preferred by lone parents because it is founded on trust and familiarity, is 
generally free and flexible responding to changes in parents’ working hours 
and thereby makes paid work more affordable and manageable. Also, in 
relation to negotiating informal childcare the evidence uncovers an expressed 
desire to pay for this care, but this is not straightforward with differences 
operating in negotiations with grandparents compared to other family friends. 
This paper will argue that a state subsidy for informal childcare could provide 
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real diversity and choice in childcare options further enabling lone parents’ 
employment opportunities.    
 
The National Childcare Strategy: a partial intervention? 
 
The National Childcare Strategy (NCS) aims to expand formal childcare 
services in order to drive up employment participation rates of low income 
families. So far the government has concentrated its efforts on increasing the 
number of formal childcare places and on making it more attractive and 
affordable to parents. The current and future aims of policy are to further 
improve quality standards, to streamline the regulation and inspection 
frameworks, to ensure adequate provision for parents who work through 
imposing a new duty on LA’s a duty and to integrate childcare more effectively 
with education (HM Treasury 2004b). To this end, new 2008 targets have 
been set to have 50 per cent usage of formal care among low income families 
and to increase the stock of formal Ofsted registered childcare by 10% (HM 
Treasury 2004a: 6). Affordability of formal childcare is a crucial issue for this 
strategy. 
 
To make childcare more affordable, a government subsidy in the form of the 
‘childcare element’ of the Working Tax Credit (WTC) is available 1. However, 
in April 2005 it only covers 80 per cent of childcare costs up to certain limits 
resulting in low average payouts of just £51 per week (National Statistics 
2005:14). Consequently, it has been argued that compared to parents in 
OECD countries, parents in the UK pay the bulk of their childcare costs; 75 
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per cent on average compared to an average of 25-30 per cent in the OECD 
(Daycare Trust 2004).  Therefore, the value of the subsidy is limited. 
Moreover, it is restricted to formal childcare such as nursery schools and 
classes, play groups, day nurseries, childminders, out-of-school clubs and 
childcare workers that are ‘approved’ to provide care in parents’ own homes 
under the Home Childcarers scheme (introduced in April 2003).  Childcare 
provided by family members (including grandparents and non-resident 
parents as well as other kin) and friends and neighbours is not considered as 
formal childcare, even if it is provided full-time.  
 
Importantly, in 2003, the government considered providing an informal 
childcare subsidy as part of their concern to meet welfare-to-work and anti-
child poverty strategies, but the idea was rejected: 
 
‘The Government recognises the huge contribution that informal care 
makes to family life. However it is not the Government’s role to offer 
financial support for care that is freely given within families and it would 
also be extremely intrusive to make appropriate checks for payments 
between family members or friends.’ (HM Treasury 2004b:37) 
 
It was seen as contentious option by the Work and Pensions Select 
Committee’s (HC 2003) because they believed that costs could spiral out of 
control 2, that it would be too difficult to police administratively, that it would 
potentially undermine the drive for improved standards in formal childcare and 
most importantly, it would not expand the number of childcare places as 
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informal carers would ‘simply provide the care they would have provided 
anyway’ (HC 2003: para 100). 
 
On these grounds, an informal childcare subsidy was counter to the aims of 
the NCS to expand formal provision and improve quality in order to drive up 
employment rates among low income families. Alternatively, the committee 
recommended that a new light touch Childcare Approval Scheme be 
implemented by April 2005. This would introduce a simpler registration 
process to enable ‘nannies’ and other formal providers experiencing 
difficulties with registration (such as out-of-school clubs) to become registered 
and eligible for the childcare element of WTC (DfES 2004: foreword: 4). This 
could help ensure high standards and increase the number of places as these 
new registered carers could take on more children (HC 2003: para 103). 
Alongside this, the eligibility criteria for the formal childcare subsidy were 
extended to cover more families and the amounts were increased3.   
 
Effectively the new scheme makes it simpler for some formal providers to be 
approved to meet the childcare subsidy eligibility criteria. It does not recognise 
family and friends as bone fide childcare providers, at least not unless they go 
though training, vetting procedures and submit themselves and their homes to 
annual inspections (DfES 2004: 9). The scheme falls far short of demands 
made by the Daycare Trust for a state investment in informal childcare and for 
family and friends to be encouraged ‘into the fold’ through the provision of a 
fast track registration process (Daycare Trust 2003). Nor is it being 
considered in future plans, there is no mention of it in the childcare Bill (2005) 
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and it was dismissed as a policy option in the ten year childcare strategy (HM 
Treasury 2004b).  
 
Conceivably, the subsidy is therefore not going to maximise its potential to 
increase employment rates in low-income families.  Indeed, take up of the 
childcare element of the WTC is low among lone parent families; in 2005 only 
223,800 lone parents claimed it out of 1.06 million who could have potentially 
done so as they were in receipt of Working Tax Credit (National Statistics 
2005:14). There are numerous reasons for the low take-up rate: Eligibility 
criteria is ‘too tough’ as few families meet all requirements (HC 2003: para 
71). Also, there are wide regional variations in childcare places for pre-school 
children ranging from 11 to 58 places per 100 children across Local 
Authorities. There is also insufficient flexible provision to cover evenings and 
weekends, for disabled children and for children living in disadvantaged areas 
(NAO 2004:6). Most importantly however, evidence shows that restricting the 
subsidy to formal care has resulted in low take-up rates because most 
families rely mainly on informal care, particularly lone parent families (HC 
2003: para 71).  Chart 1 shows that lone parents are more likely than couples 
to rely solely on informal care.   
 
Chart 1 about here 
 
The policy drive to increase formal childcare places is discordant with the 
expressed preferences of many, particularly lone parents, for informal 
childcare. Policy solutions assume that low-income and lone mother families 
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would move into employment if formal childcare provision was adequate and if 
the right financial incentives to ‘make work pay’ were in place.  On the one 
hand this is a reasonable assumption. It is certainly common sense to argue 
that most mothers with caring responsibilities for dependent children would 
need some form of childcare to free up their time to work and presumably they 
would also have to consider if the costs of this care outweighed the financial 
rewards from working. On the other hand in-depth research with lone mothers 
and couple mothers shows that these cost-benefit calculations tend to be 
secondary in decisions about employment (Duncan and Edwards 1999; 
Duncan et al 2003; Duncan et al 2004).  
 
It has been argued that uppermost in mothers’ decision processes about 
employment is their beliefs about good mothering and what is best for their 
child. These beliefs underpin preferences and choices about childcare and 
work and have been shown to be morally and normatively determined by 
social, cultural, class and geographical contexts (Duncan and Edwards 1999; 
Duncan et al 2003; Duncan 2003). For example evidence shows that middle 
class mothers may choose a formal childcare service for a pre school aged 
child on the basis of whether it can provide easier access to a good school, 
rather than solely to meet the mothers’ employment needs (Vincent et al 
2004). In comparison, other evidence suggests that working class mothers 
are deeply distrusting of formal childcare, preferring family care for their 
children (Duncan and Edwards 1999). 
 
 9
Therefore, mothers’ decisions about childcare and employment are said to be 
underpinned by ‘gendered moral rationalities’ whereby mothers work out what 
is best for their children on the basis of ideas about good mothering.  It is 
argued that government is making a ‘rationality mistake’ by designing policy 
primarily on the basis of cost-benefit calculations (Duncan and Edwards1999). 
Policy fails to take adequate account of the decision-making process (Duncan 
and Irwin 2004) and how the moral and normative assessments about 
children’s and mothers’ needs are linked or balanced.  
 
Thus, as Land (2002:19) argues an expansion of formal care will not 
necessarily reduce the need or wish for informal care. This might especially 
be the case where informal care supports parental employment by helping to 
coordinate formal services. That is where friends and family transport children 
across different childcare and educational settings (Skinner 2003, 2005; Bell 
et al 2005) and where informal care fits with formal care in a ‘caring jigsaw’ 
Wheelock and Jones 2002). Due acknowledgement of this coordination 
support has been given by government as ‘the glue’ that holds complex 
childcare arrangements together (HM Treasury 2004b: para 5.13). There may 
therefore be hidden, but additional benefits in supporting informal care as it 
helps bond formal services together more effectively.  Given the importance of 
informal care to lone parent families, we need to understand more about how 
preferences for it operate in relation to formal care, how it is negotiated 
among families and the potential of a state subsidy to support this provision. 
The interesting question is whether the government has missed an important 
opportunity to support diversity and choice in childcare and thereby 
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employment opportunities. Findings from a recent research study on lone 
parent families provide some evidence to address this question.  
 
Methodology  
 
The findings reported here form part of a Department of Work and Pensions 
qualitative study commissioned to explore lone parents’ (mainly mothers) 
childcare and labour market decisions (Bell et al 2005). Whilst much is 
already known about this topic, this study aimed to explore in depth the 
complex interplay between attitudes/ beliefs and the actual decisions made 
about childcare (formal and informal) and employment. It also aimed to 
understand more about lone parents’ daily lived experiences in negotiating 
and coordinating childcare and work and the strategies involved. The study 
did not explicitly explore an informal childcare subsidy, but much of the 
evidence on attitudes and how informal childcare was negotiated provide 
some useful insights which are drawn upon here to advance the debate about 
an informal childcare subsidy. 
 
The study constructed a purposive sample of 78 lone parents for in-depth 
semi-structured interviews from among respondents to the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS) who had consented to being contacted again for research 
purposes. The FRS is an annual survey which collects information on the 
incomes and circumstances of private households in the United Kingdom 
(around 24,000 households per annum) and is sponsored by the DWP. The 
purposive sample was constructed to include lone parents who had at least 
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one child aged 10 years or younger, to provide roughly equal numbers of lone 
parents who were in paid work and not in work and to include a selection of 
parents from urban, rural and inner city areas in England to reflect differential 
access to childcare services. The sample was also designed to reflect 
diversity in patterns of childcare use (formal and informal childcare), work 
patterns (a mix of part and full-time employment) and parental age. Diversity 
in these characteristics was achieved. However, the study did not set out to 
gain a purposive sample that included significant numbers of lone fathers or to 
conduct a gender analysis. Only three lone fathers were included reflecting 
the representativeness of the FRS where fathers make up only a small 
percentage of the lone parent population.  The term lone parent is used rather 
than lone mother to reflect the fact that the sample contained both men and 
women, but the majority were obviously mothers.  
 
The data from the in-depth interviews was analysed systematically using 
‘Framework’, a qualitative analysis method that uses a thematic approach to 
classify and interpret qualitative research data. Key topics that emerged from 
the data were identified through coding of transcripts and developed into 
themes which were then placed onto a matrix using Excel spreadsheets. The 
columns in each matrix represented the key sub-themes or topics whilst the 
rows represented individual respondents.  Individual responses were 
summarized in each cell of the grid which included some verbatim quotes. In 
this paper verbatim quotes or words used by respondents are italicised and in 
quotation marks for easy identification.  
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This paper reports on the findings to contribute to the debate about whether 
informal childcare should attract a childcare subsidy. 
 
Informal Care Versus Formal Care  
 
Choices around informal and formal childcare are particularly crucial for lone 
parents. Many have no available partner to help share the burden of parenting 
– including emotionally and financially - and they can therefore make these 
decisions in very different contexts to couple parents. Whilst we recognize the 
importance of class, gender, culture and ethnicity in shaping beliefs about 
motherhood and preferences around childcare it was not the intention of our 
study to explore these differences, but rather to consider perceptions of the 
relative merits of formal versus informal care from among a diverse group of 
lone parents. Our interviews with mainly lone mothers show that some held 
deeply embedded preferences for informal over formal childcare (though 
parents did not use these terms referring instead to specific types of childcare  
childminder, grandmother, nursery etc). Four broad reasons emerged on why 
this was the case and these were: trust, commitment, shared understandings 
and children’s happiness.    
 
Trust and commitment  
 
Concerns about trust, safety and commitment were among the strongest 
determinants of some parents’ preferences for informal over formal care. This 
is consistent with other evidence exploring lone parents’ childcare choices 
(Woodland et al 2002; Duncan and Edwards 1999). The evidence reported 
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here shows that the lone parents tended to distinguish between childcare 
providers as people they knew versus ‘strangers’, which mirrored a division 
between those they ‘trusted’ and those they did not. Often this meant family 
and friends being singled out as trustworthier than formal childcare providers. 
This adds to earlier evidence from Wheelock and Jones (2002) in their study 
of informal childcare. They found that parents contrasted sharply the elements 
of love and trustworthiness of informal care with the ‘outsider’ or ‘stranger’ 
elements of formal care. Bur for some of the lone parents here, we also saw 
that preferences for informal care were underpinned by a sense of fear about 
the potential maltreatment of children “behind closed doors’” in formal care 
settings such as nurseries or childminders. This was often fed by media scare 
stories highlighting the neglect and maltreatment of children in particular 
formal settings, but it could also arise as a result of previous experiences of 
poor care of their children or from negative memories about the poor care 
received by themselves as children in formal care. These could be so 
powerful an influence that some were determined never to use the particular 
type of formal care.  Yet, there were some positive attitudes too. Some lone 
parents’ fears over formal childcare had changed after having the chance to 
try and test a formal provider out and others could be reassured about their 
child’s safety because providers used web cameras or sent digital 
photographs via email.  
 
Views on the commitment of providers also appeared to influence informal 
care preferences. Family and friends were often seen as providing childcare 
‘out of the kindness of their hearts’ or of being able to “stick by you” or would 
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“rally round” when needed. That these people might actively want to look after 
the children and could be relied upon, even at short notice, acted in favour of 
informal childcare to such an extent that in some cases formal care was never 
even considered. But contrary views were also apparent. Some lone parents 
expressed concerns about family/friends providing support out of a sense of 
reluctant duty/obligation rather than on willingness and they believed this 
might compromise the quality of care given. Others were worried about 
“putting on” people to provide regular care or they felt “guilty” about relying on 
them. For grandparental care in particular, there were some concerns 
expressed about it not being their role to provide childcare: “they brought us 
up, why should they bring mine up?” All these beliefs could limit the use made 
of informal care to emergencies only.  
 
 
Shared understandings 
Having shared values over childrearing practices also influenced preferences 
for informal care and lone parents were concerned how carers might 
discipline children and the values they might instil. They appreciated having a 
shared understanding on these issues, particularly with informal carers. Other 
evidence has shown that grandparents are often seen as the “next best thing” 
to the parent (Wheelock and Jones 2002; Woodland et al 2002). As one 
respondent said of grandmother care: 
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  “and [she] bring[s] them [the children] up the way I want her to 
and…they get  80 percent or 90 percent of the same treatment as 
they would with me”  (Lone mother of twins aged nine, worker) 
 
However, not all family and friends were considered to have similar 
childrearing practices and some negative views were expressed about family 
and friends’ different parenting styles and about some grandparents’ 
inadequate childrearing practices when they were children. Grandparents 
were sometimes also regarded as having a tendency to “interfere” with the 
lone parents’ childrearing practices. Yet, at the same time having experience 
of rearing children was viewed as a positive feature of informal carers.  
 
Children’s happiness 
 
Children’s happiness and safety were also important factors shaping informal 
care preferences. The lone parents frequently talked about “wanting them to 
be happy”’ and children being cared for in familiar surroundings was often 
seen as key.  This was viewed as being more easily achieved in informal care 
settings than in formal care. Also, that friends, family and especially ex-
partners (mainly fathers) had affection for or “loved” their children, and thus 
would give them special attention was favoured over formal providers with 
some parents saying that their children would be “safe and cared for 
completely” with informal carers.  
 
 16
Yet, there were other reasons why family members in general - and 
grandparents in particular – might not easily enable a child’s happiness. This 
was mainly due to their perceived inability to provide desired activities or 
stimulation leading to boredom and unhappiness in the child. A further 
potential disadvantage was the lack of opportunity for social interaction with 
other children, which was considered to be a major benefit of group-based 
formal provision such as out-of-school clubs, nurseries, playgroups and 
crèches. Such opportunities for social interaction were considered especially 
important for an only child and for younger children whose older brothers and 
sisters had already started school. The socialising function of nurseries in 
particular was also considered important in order to prepare children for the 
“shock” of starting school.   
 
The findings from this analysis of lone parents’ childcare preferences 
demonstrates that there is no particular norm operating that always favours 
informal over formal care. However, informal childcare was seen as 
particularly advantageous in terms of safety, commitment, shared 
understandings over childrearing practices and children’s happiness. These 
findings are similar to Wheelock and Jones (2002) study on informal care, but 
they also found grandparental care improved social well-being for working 
families as parents would not worry about their children when they were at 
work.  On these dimensions at least, formal childcare seemed to be more 
problematic in relation to meeting these lone parents’ perceptions about 
quality of care, with the possible exception of providing social interaction with 
other children which was seen as a particular advantage of formal group-
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based care. Even so, these preferences have to be enacted in order for 
childcare to be used. Yet we know little about how informal childcare 
arrangements are negotiated or how the nature of negotiations with 
grandparents as close kin might differ from those made with friends or other 
family members. A greater understanding of this process of negotiation might 
provide insights into whether an informal childcare subsidy would be useful in 
facilitating informal care arrangements and thereby enabling lone parents’ 
employment.  
 
Negotiating Informal Childcare Support  
Grandparents 
 
Negotiations with grandparents about childcare to cover lone parents’ 
employment needs tended to be a very implicit affair. The process was not 
easily explained by lone parents and they tended to say that arrangements 
had “just happened” that  grandparents had “just offered’”, “just rallied round” 
or gave support out of the “kindness of their heart’”. Even so, it appeared that 
a number of subtly different expectations were operating. On the one hand, 
expectations were expressed that grandparental care should be offered 
(almost regardless of the grandparents’ abilities to provide it), on the other 
hand parents appeared hopeful that it might be offered saying they would “not 
ask” for it.  
 
Expecting that it might be offered was more common. Under these 
circumstances it seemed grandparents were left to decide to help or not and 
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when they did, lone parents typically accepted that they were willing and able 
to do so. Except that is, where lone parents believed grandparents were 
incapable due to ill health, or frailty (where looking after children was 
considered as being “too hard”) or where they had other commitments such 
as work or caring for another relative. Sometimes, grandparents themselves 
were said to place limits on the amount of childcare offered for the same kinds 
of reasons. More rarely, some lone parents believed that it should be given 
even when grandparents were said to be no longer capable or willing to 
provide it. But, this tended to be related to perceptions that formal care was 
unaffordable and not a realistic option. Under such circumstances tensions 
could be created leading to “family rows”.  
 
Very occasionally however, expectations were expressed more explicitly. One 
lone parent said she expected no support from the grandmother but qualified 
this by saying that, if the grandmother were to offer to provide childcare, she 
would pay her to do so. In this more unusual case the grandmother was 
relatively young and had a dependent child of her own and she and her 
daughter cared for each others children on a reciprocal basis for purposes 
other than paid work. This may explain why this lone parent wanted to pay for 
the care if needed for employment purposes. Her lack of expectation of 
support may also have been related to a perception, echoed by some others, 
that grandparents should only provide childcare if and when they are 
genuinely willing to do so: 
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“I think sometimes they [grandparents] feel obligated as well and that 
puts a strain on the relationship, like if you're asking them to look after 
your child and then they don't really want to, there's somewhere else 
they really want to be but they don't really want to say no to you at the 
same time.”  (Lone parent, worker)  
 
Despite this, it was uncommon for grandparents to be paid for providing 
childcare. Only one parent paid a grandmother for her time in cash, although 
there were others who had offered money to grandparents but these offers 
had been declined. Sometimes, efforts were made to pay grandparents back 
‘in kind’ by taking them shopping or buying small gifts. This demonstrates that 
the principle of reciprocity was operated by lone parents in these negotiations.   
 
Overall, there appeared to be two strands to expectations for grandparental 
childcare – one where the lone parents seemed to put the needs of the 
grandparent above the needs for childcare or one where the needs for 
grandparental childcare came first. It was not possible to tell from this study 
the full range of factors underpinning these differences – other than 
grandparents’ health and well-being was seen as a prime concern. What it 
does demonstrate however, is the complex interplay between perceptions of 
grandparents’ willingness and abilities to provide care, their perceived 
obligation to do so and whether the lone parent should reciprocate in cash or 
kind for care given. Other evidence from the grandparents’ perspective 
provides some further insights as to what might be happening. 
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Arthur et al (2003) explored the nature of relations across three generations in 
related families for grandparental contact and childcare. They found that 
grandparents tended to strongly resist the idea of reciprocity in relation to an 
expectation of a return for childcare given. Rather they were keen to point out 
that childcare was offered for the enjoyment and love of their grandchildren 
and to help out their adult children. Grandparents therefore, rejected any offer 
of payment (gifts or cash) and for some they felt cash payment would turn 
their care giving into a ‘job’, which they did not want (Arthur et al 2003:67).  
 
On the basis of this evidence, Arthur et al (2003) argued that grandparents did 
not see childcare as a service or exchange per se – but part of their 
interactions and relations with family members and valued it for its own sake, 
for its intrinsic value, particularly in relation to time spent with grandchildren. 
Parents on the other hand were more likely to see this is a reciprocal 
exchange as they were more able to appreciate the extrinsic value of 
childcare offered by grandparents because they knew the market value of the 
childcare given and therefore how much money they saved. Despite this 
difference, Arthur et al (2003) suggest that both sides were operating within a 
‘moral economy’ of exchange where there is intrinsic value in mutual support 
and that both sides derive value from the exchange. Other evidence on 
grandparental care found that grandparents saw childcare as a reward in 
itself, that it arose from love and they did not want payment for doing it 
(Wheelock and Jones 2002: 455). We can see this also operating in the 
accounts given by lone parents in our study. The question is whether lone 
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parents’ negotiations with friends and other family members operated in a 
similar way?  
 
Other relatives and friends 
 
Negotiations with friends or other relatives for childcare appeared to carry 
more explicit expectations of reciprocity than was the case with grandparents. 
When lone parents used other relatives or friends for regular childcare (not 
occasional care) they were more likely to have offered payment of some kind 
or to have expressed a wish to offer payment. For some, they said this was to 
make their arrangements more “business like”.  In general though, the lone 
parents offered gifts, childcare or other forms of support (rather than cash) “in 
return” to friends or extended family members.  The phrase “in return” shows 
the explicit nature of reciprocity expressed here and that the exchanges 
should be kept in balance. As one parent described her relations with her 
sister-in-law: 
 
“Yeah, and I felt like cos it was my sister-in-law doing it and my sister 
couldn’t obviously she had like, she was doing a hairdressing course, I 
mean she was full time, she was busy, and so I felt, yeah, I did, I felt 
like, you know, in return I had to put a lot of effort in making sure that 
my brothers were OK, do you know what I mean, like keeping 
everybody happy.” (Lone parent, worker) 
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It seems that lone parents were more in favour of paying for childcare 
provided by other family and friends than by grandparents and this was 
underpinned by more explicit notions of reciprocity. Other theoretical work on 
the nature of negotiations might help to cast some light on why these 
apparently subtle differences exist. 
 
In Finch and Mason’s (1993) seminal work on kin relationships, they explored 
the nature of family negotiations between adult children and their elderly 
parents for ‘care’. They found that in offering support, family members did not 
operate on a basis of fixed rules or norms, but rather entered into an implicit 
process of negotiation whereby they relied on certain criteria or guidelines to 
help them work out the ‘right thing to do’ under the circumstances. They 
demonstrated that the principles of obligation and reciprocity were some of 
the key guidelines used to work out the right thing to do and importantly that 
reciprocity operated differently depending on the nature of relationships. They 
identified two kinds - ‘balanced reciprocity’ whereby a return is expected fairly 
immediately for services or care offered and ‘generalised reciprocity’ where 
there is no expectation of an immediate return. Close kin relationships, such 
as between a parent and child tended to operate under the latter as there is a 
longer time scale in expectations of a return or no return is expected at all. 
Thereby, close genealogical kin relationships are more tolerant of imbalances 
in exchanges. 
 
Applying this to the evidence here among lone parents, it could be argued that 
the onus was more often upon grandparents, as the potential givers of 
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childcare, to do the thinking and decision-making. This can be seen where 
lone parents’ expectations were founded on the idea that childcare from 
grandparents might be offered, that they would not ‘ask for it’ or that it had 
‘just happened’. This also helps demonstrate why it was difficult for lone 
parents to explain how decisions for childcare with grandparents were made. 
Moreover, the apparent differences in the way reciprocity operated lends 
weight to the idea that a more ‘balanced reciprocity’ expectation operated with 
other family/friends than with grandparents. This was most evident in the 
explicit desire to give something back ‘in return’ to friends or other relatives or 
to put arrangements on a more ‘business like’ basis.  
 
Reciprocity was not absent in grandparental negotiations however, and it 
could be that operating this principle is not straightforward here because the 
‘giving’ of informal childcare involves three generations, grandparents, parents 
and grandchildren. The guideline of reciprocity may work differently between 
grandparent and parent relations than between grandparent and grandchild.  
For example, it can be surmised that the three generational exchanges 
operated within a framework of generalised reciprocity, at least from the 
grandparents’ perspective. This is clearly seen in the strong resistance to 
payment where such an event seemed to be regarded by grandparents as 
changing the basis on which mutual support was offered and received (Arthur 
et al 2003; Wheelock and Jones 2002). That is potentially changing a norm of 
generalised reciprocity where exchanges were valued intrinsically, to a norm 
of balanced reciprocity where exchanges veered towards more extrinsic value 
judgements. Thus, the balanced reciprocity guideline was strongly regarded 
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as inappropriate by grandparents (mainly grandmothers) in their role as 
givers, but not necessarily by lone parents (mainly mothers) in their role as 
receivers as they expressed a desire to pay for grandparental childcare 
 
The lone parent evidence also suggests that negotiations for childcare may 
operate differently with other family and friends – here there is a greater 
expectation of payment and these relations seem to be underpinned more by 
notions of balanced reciprocity where parents wanted to pay in return for 
childcare. This might be because relations with friends/ other family are 
mainly two-way involving the giver the receiver only and are not part of three 
way intergenerational exchanges involving the child. It seems there is a more 
direct and explicit interaction between the giver and receiver in family and 
friend relationships. In these situations parents’ may have to ask’ for childcare 
and the givers of childcare may feel less obligated to provide it as part of their 
individual relationship with the child as might be the case with grandparents. 
This difference in reciprocity across these set of relationships is described in 
figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 here. 
 
This has implications for the idea that government should offer a childcare 
subsidy for informal care.   
 
Conclusion  
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We know that informal childcare is the most commonly used form of childcare 
among lone parents, and they are more likely than couples to use informal 
care on its own rather than in combination with other formal care. It is 
important for policymakers to recognise that some lone parents genuinely 
prefer informal childcare to all forms of formal care, that it may be the most 
appropriate and effective option for them (for example in the evenings and at 
night) and that it carries additional benefits in enhancing family well-being.   
Individual lone parents have different preferences about work and childcare, 
and these are strongly influenced by class, culture and situation. For this 
reason, a priority should be to support a variety of childcare options, informal 
as well as formal. However, whether or not the government should provide a 
childcare subsidy for informal care is not clear-cut. As Land (2002:13) argues 
‘Rewarding, regulating and sustaining providers of informal care raise 
complex and controversial issues’. Also according to Williams (2004:76) 
providing payment for informal care may simply reinforce gender inequalities 
and the idea that a women’s role is to care.  
 
On the one hand the evidence presented here on grandparental childcare 
suggests that the government may well have made the correct decision to 
stay out of private family relationships that involve such complex notions of 
obligation and generalised reciprocity. It is possible that a state subsidy to pay 
grandparents may create unease in relationships as it could apply pressure 
on unsure/unwilling grandparents to provide care where they feel they have 
an obligation to do so but may not that be that willing. Certainly there was 
some evidence among lone parents to suggest that where this happened it 
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could create ‘family rows’. Alternatively, grandparents may feel that payment 
devalues their caregiving as purely paid work and therefore devoid of the 
social relationships underpinning it.  In either event, the state runs the risk of 
being an undesirable interloper in these private exchange relations, 
particularly if it insists in having a role as a regulator or approver of such care. 
What we do not know however, is whether male caregivers (grandfathers and 
other relatives/friends) would view payment in the same way as all the 
evidence on informal care comes primarily from grandmothers and mothers. 
Despite the potential gender differences, it would also be very difficult for 
administrators to police the subsidy and the potential for fraud would be 
considerable flying in the face of the government’s principle of ‘progressive 
universalism’ where some support is offered for all and ‘and most support for 
those who need it most’ (HM Treasury 2004b:4). On the other hand, a 
reasonable minority of informal carers are paid, especially friends and other 
relatives; 11 per cent and 8 per cent received cash for childcare  compared to 
just 3 per cent of grandparents (La Valle et al 2000). It does seem that there is 
some scope for an informal childcare subsidy, particularly to friends and other 
kin where there seems to be a clearer expectation of balanced reciprocity - 
paying in return for care received.  
 
Ultimately, one argument in favour of a subsidy for informal childcare is that it 
could extend childcare and work choices and thereby help reduce child 
poverty. For example, payment for informal care could encourage some lone 
mothers into employment where they were held back because of a lack of 
trust of formal care. More pragmatically, such a subsidy could be used to pay 
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informal carers for providing care wrapped round the school day and/or for 
helping transport children between formal childcare/education services and 
the home (see Bell et al 2005; Skinner 2003 & 2005; Himmelweit and Sigala 
2004; Wheelock and Jones 2002). It therefore has the potential to help 
informal carers coordinate disparate formal childcare/education provision and 
fill gaps in out of normal childcare hours. This kind of coordination support is 
still likely to be needed even if universal state funded childcare were provided. 
The government may therefore be too dismissive of the importance of the 
‘glue’ of informal care that binds formal arrangements together and aids 
employment. 
 
The debate however, has been prematurely cut short by the government’s 
decision against subsidising informal care. As the EOC (2003: para 63) 
previously argued: ‘Before conclusions are drawn either way on the role of 
informal care, further work is needed to investigate what is meant by quality 
childcare, and to understand more fully parental expectations and 
preferences’. We would add that the ways in which informal care payments 
might work needs greater understanding to fully evaluate its potential in 
supporting this key form of provision in a mixed economy of childcare. In 
particular the new evidence presented here on lone parents’ negotiations for 
informal childcare suggests that these operate differently with friends and 
other extended kin than with grandparents as they are underpinned by 
different notions of reciprocity. In negotiations with friends/neighbours and 
other extended kin there seems to be a clearer notion of balanced exchange 
where payments are more welcome and could carry a business like 
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expectation and arrangement. Potentially at least, a subsidy for this type of 
informal care may actually expand its usage as it could release parents from 
feeling they would be a burden if they sought regular childcare support from 
these social networks. Thereby, an informal childcare subsidy could expand 
childcare choices and improve employment options for lone parents. There 
may also be some potential for a subsidy to encourage men and particularly 
grandfathers to participate in childcare, though there is no evidence for this.  
Conceivably, the Work and Pensions Select Committee was mistaken in 
lumping together all types of informal childcare as free and non-expandable 
family care. In the light of the evidence presented here, the potential of an 
informal childcare subsidy merits further investigation particularly how it might 
be perceived by male carers especially grandfathers, extended kin (not just 
grandparents) and friends.   
 
Notes 
1. The subsidy was originally called the Childcare Tax Credit but was 
renamed the ‘childcare element’ of Working Tax Credit in changes 
made to tax credits in April 2003. 
2. Costs were estimated to rise from existing expenditure of £195 
million to between £263 million and £8.2 billion under different 
scenarios (HC 2003: para 82). 
3. In April 2005 the maximum childcare costs covered increased from 
£135 to £175 a week for one child and from £200 to £300 for two or 
more children and the maximum proportion of costs that can be 
claimed increased from 70 per cent to 80 per cent in April 2006 (HM 
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Treasury 2004b:51). Consideration is being given to extending 
entitlement to parents who work less than 16 hours (HM Treasury 
2004b:31). 
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Chart 1: Source of childcare used by lone parents and couples in 2001. 
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Figure 1:  Difference in reciprocal relations with grandparents and other 
family/ friends for childcare 
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